Anti Realism v Moral Realism Debate Notes

Some notes & thoughts on Anti-realism/Morality

Recently, I had a discussion/debate about meta-ethics, revisiting the age-old question of whether morals are subjective or objective. My position is simple: morals are subjective, and there is nothing we can convincingly point to that demonstrates a mind-independent source of moral value.

This does not rule out the possibility of finding a good argument or evidence for objective morality in the future. It simply means there aren’t many compelling ones now. I have read Derek Parfit’s work, and if he cannot persuade me of the intellectual virtue of moral realism, I am doubtful anyone else will.

I haven’t written on moral anti-realism before, but I think this is a good opportunity to (briefly) explain why I find the arguments for objective morality unconvincing, and why moral anti-realism is clearly true. Below are some notes that explain why I am a moral anti-realist and the position I’ve adopted. Sorry in advance - I know they are disorganized and it’s not the most elegantly structured piece of writing.

For the record, while I may not be sympathetic to moral realist arguments themselves, I do appreciate the idea of objective morality. There is much injustice in the world, and it would be comforting if there were some clearly discernible objective feature of the world that prescribes right and wrong, one that we could refer to as a source of moral authority. However, as the appeal to consequences argument goes, our desire for certain outcomes does not validate an argument—only the argument itself can do that.

The debate/discussion video is posted at the bottom.

Intros

First, let’s engage in semantic analysis to clarify with George, or anyone else following this discussion, the definition of moral realism and how we are using the term. By "moral realism," I mean the belief that moral facts or values exist independently of human or sentient minds.

My main objection to moral realism lies in the assertion that there is a mind-independent source of moral value—in other words, the idea that moral facts exist outside of human or sentient experience.

However, I want to clarify that I do not object to policy-based "universal morals"—for example, international human rights or similar frameworks. My dispute with moral realism is philosophical and theoretical, situated within analytical philosophy.

I do think there are good practical and policy reasons to treat some values and norms as universal, but this is based on my preferences, which align with many of the preferences of society at large. It is possible for a large group of people to collectively share the same moral preferences, but this is not the same as claiming that there is a mind-independent source of moral value, or that moral value exists beyond human or sentient minds.

A quick note on anti-realism

This point isn’t central to the arguments or discussion, but it’s worth addressing.

There is a critique against some forms of anti-realism or subjective morality, suggesting they have contributed to the decay of Western institutions and universities.

From my understanding, this critique is primarily aimed at cultural relativism ((and to a lesser extent, moral relativism) a specific branch of ethics. It’s debatable whether these categories of relativism should be considered a true form of moral anti-realism, or if it represents something distinct.

Cultural relativism argues that morality is largely dictated by culture, which has led to many academics holding questionable views, such as the idea that Muslim women love being forced to wear cloth bags or that eating animals is morally acceptable simply because a given culture permits it.

Because of this, there is a belief that all forms of anti-realism will inevitably lead to negative consequences, a claim that I find unsubstantiated.

After giving it some thought, I believe the real culprit here is mostly cultural relativism—which has been especially detrimental for animals and women who live under horrific regimes. This is because cultural relativism posits culture as the determining force or authority for values, making it highly human-centric, perhaps even more so than other ethical frameworks.

My approach to anti-realism is rooted in individual preference, which would naturally include consideration of the individual preferences of animals.

The point I’m making is that anti-realism perse does not have to be hostile to animal rights or to other causes we deeply care about. It all depends on how we use these tools of knowledge.

Break down the different fields of ethics

In the field of ethics, there are three branches.

a. Normative ethics - deals with questions of what should I do? What ought to I do? And this is where people use frameworks to guide their thoughts and actions such as deontology, utilitarianism, consequentialism etc.

b. Applied ethics - sort of deals with real world issues, applying ethical principles to real world dilemmas e.g. Euthanasia, Environmental type issues, etc.

c. Meta -ethics - Meta-ethics delves into the nature, scope, and meaning of moral concepts and judgments. It asks foundational questions like “What does it mean to say something is good?” and “Are moral truths objective or subjective?” Meta-ethics explores whether moral values are universal or relative and the nature of moral reasoning.

It is not really asking what we should or should not do, it's asking what we mean when we say something is good or something is bad.

This debate/discussion will focus on the third category, meta-ethics.

Moral Anti-realism

In analytical philosophy, anti-realism is the position that the truth of a statement depends on its demonstrability through internal mechanisms, such as logic and empirical evidence. This stands in direct opposition to realism, which typically argues that the truth of a statement rests on its correspondence to an external, independent reality.

As a moral anti-realist, I believe that moral values and facts do not exist independently of human beliefs or perceptions. Unlike moral realism, which claims that moral truths are objective and exist regardless of what people think, anti-realism asserts that morality is subjective or constructed.

Distinguishing descriptive statements from normative statements

Descriptive Claim:

A descriptive claim states facts about the world, describing how things are without making any judgment about whether it's good or bad. It reports observations, events, or states of affairs.

Example: “The Earth revolves around the sun” or “Most people prefer chocolate vegan ice cream.”

Normative Claim:

A normative claim makes a judgment about how things ought to be. It prescribes a certain standard, value, or behavior and often involves concepts of right and wrong, good and bad.

Example: People ought to be kind to one another or “it is wrong to steal.”

The Is-Ought Gap

David Hume's is-ought gap says you cannot derive an ought from an is. This means that just because something is happening, such as saving someone from drowning, or something like a murder or rape is happening, the description of the action, or the action alone does not tell us whether it is good or bad.

So, there is no leap or logical connection between this action and some kind of unseeable moral standard that is supposed to exist.

The is-ought gap is less of problem for anti-realists as we do not believe in an objective moral standard and can simply say "x action is wrong or right because I think it is [i.e. preference motivated].

Confusing scientific inquiry to moral philosophy

• Stemming from a confusion usually related to the is-ought gap is the comparison of scientific inquiry to moral philosophy.

• One is describing and understanding the physical phenomena of the world - that does not mean science cannot inform or help us make moral decisions, it simply means it does not determine whether something is right or wrong - only our values can do that.

• Moral philosophy is about normative and meta ethical claims.

Distinguishing scientific query from moral philosophy

1. The Argument: Since our knowledge is fallible and constantly evolving, we can't claim certainty in areas like science. Thus, it's inconsistent to reject moral realism solely because it lacks absolute certainty.

2. Why It's Flawed: This argument confuses the nature of scientific inquiry with moral philosophy. Science is based on empirical evidence and the scientific method, which allows for testing, falsification, and refinement. While it's true that scientific knowledge evolves, it is grounded in observable, testable phenomena. Moral realism, on the other hand, deals with abstract, non-empirical claims about moral facts.

3. The Counter: The evolving nature of science doesn't undermine its reliability; it's a strength that allows for correction and improvement over time. Rejecting moral realism doesn't mean rejecting all forms of knowledge or certainty; rather, it's about recognizing the distinct nature of moral claims and the challenges in grounding them in objective

Appeal to consequence

A common claim I have heard moral realists make is something along the lines of “if we don't believe in moral realism, then we have to admit murder, rape and the murder and rape of animals is just a moral preference, like everything else.”

Such is an appeal to consequences, see blurb below and it SHALL NOT PASS.

Related: Philosophy is about intellectual integrity not "persuasive advocacy"

Philosophy is about intellectual integrity and strong argumentation, not about effective advocacy or believing in things out of fear of the consequences of disbelief.

One could argue that the compelling nature of an argument doesn’t determine its truth value. For example, just because objective morality might be more persuasive in advocating for animal rights, that doesn’t make it inherently true.

Persuasion is about appealing to people's beliefs and emotions, which can vary widely. Moral realism, much like the belief in heaven or hell, can sometimes rest more on comfort than on evidence. It may be more about satisfying a psychological need for certainty than about discovering an objective truth.

It’s also important to note that thinking we need moral realism to win over people for animal rights is an unproven empirical claim, as it assumes that people prefer one meta-ethical framework over another in regards to specific issues like animal rights. We simply don’t know that. In fact, many of the smartest and most effective advocates for animal rights and veganism span both realist and anti-realist perspectives.

Challenges to Anti-realism

Usually something full retard like:

If you don't know whether morals are subjective or objective, how do you know your car is parked outside?

I am an epistemic contextualist, which largely addresses this issue.

Epistemic contextualism deals with the conditions under which knowledge claims are made, and how those conditions vary depending on the context. It’s a theory that explains how our understanding of what counts as “knowledge” shifts based on situational factors, making it a key concept in epistemology.

Epistemic contextualism holds that the standards for claiming knowledge depend on the context of the conversation or situation. In everyday, low-stakes contexts, the standards for "knowing" something are relatively low. You don't need much evidence to confidently say, "I know my keys are on the table."

However, in high-stakes or formal situations, such as a courtroom or life-or-death scenario, the standards for knowledge become much stricter. In these cases, you need stronger evidence and greater certainty to make the same claim.

In short, epistemic contextualism asserts that what counts as knowledge changes based on the situation, with higher standards applying in more serious or critical contexts.

Watch the debate here:

https://www.youtube.com/live/Y03ZuP9lShU

Patricia Nonis

30th September 2024